

overall goals that are set by representatives of the workers that they manage (Whyte and Whyte 1991).

Rawls leaves open the question whether his principles are best realized by some form of property-owning democracy or by a liberal socialist regime (Rawls [1971] 1999, xv). Rawls' theory does not address the links between economic institutions and democracy and dignity in production (242) (Taylor 2004b). Moreover, as is well known, Locke postulated a natural right to *private property* that has been interpreted as enshrining the sanctity of corporate, or social, property in *rented* human labor, in all democratic liberal capitalist constitutions, with important variations (Tuckness 2008).

Historically, this injustice has been somewhat mitigated by unions and social democratic governments that recognize the importance of "positive liberty" or the need for an equitable distribution of basic goods like education, health care, housing, and relatively equal access to property and material resources for a democracy to work. Ultimately, however, the *wage-labor* relationship has to be recognized as inherently undemocratic and immoral as it is (even with worker representatives on Board of Directors) a direct abrogation of "democratic liberty" or the principle that all should have influence, relative to the degree to which they are affected, over the major decisions that impact their lives now and in the future (Archer 1995). This is because generally most Directors (at least in theory) represent shareholders. But shareholders, who can easily change their portfolio, are generally the least impacted, relative to workers, suppliers, customers, and the local community, by corporate decisions.

The underlying claim here is that basing morality on sacred or a priori principles reverses the true and only test of morality, which is whether or not it engenders human well-being. If we are honest with ourselves, we evaluate, and sometimes pick and choose, among traditional religious and philosophical principles to arrive at a morality that is relevant to the modern world and to historically evolved social and economic institutions and *not* the other way around. Like Marx "turning Hegel upside down," it is time to turn the basis of morality "upside down" and anchor it in the real world of facts and measurable human outcomes.

I had an opportunity to outline the principles of a *democratic socialist* constitution more in alignment with economic and political morality than the currently dominant *liberal democratic* constitutions, in a 1997 visit to Cuba. In addition to establishing the need for basic human,